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Abstract
In this short survey article, I discuss Bell’s theorem and some strategies that
attempt to avoid the conclusion of non-locality. I focus on two that intersect
with the philosophy of probability: (1) quantum probabilities and (2) super-
determinism. The issues they raised not only apply to a wide class of no-
go theorems about quantum mechanics but are also of general philosophical
interest.
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1 Introduction
As early as the beginning of quantum mechanics, there have been numerous at-
tempts to prove impossibility results or “no-go” theorems about quantum mechan-
ics. They aim to show that certain plausible assumptions about the world are
impossible to maintain given the predictions of quantum mechanics, which can
and have been empirically confirmed. Some of them are more significant than
others. Arguably, the most significant is J. S. Bell’s (1964) celebrated theorem of
non-locality: given plausible assumptions, Bell shows that, in our world, events
that are arbitrarily far apart can instantaneously influence each other.
Bell’s theorem is most significant because its conclusion is so striking and its
assumptions so innocuous that it requires us to radically change how we think
about the world (and not just about quantum theory).
Before Bell’s theorem, the picture we have about the world is like this: physical
things interact only locally in space. For example, a bomb dropped on the surface
of Mars will produce immediate physical effects (chemical reactions, turbulences,
and radiations) in the immediate surroundings; the event will have (much milder)
physical effects on Earth only at a later time, via certain intermediate transmission
betweenMars and the Earth. More generally, we expect the world to work in a local
way that events arbitrarily far apart in space cannot instantaneously influence one
another. This picture is baked into classical theories of physics such as Maxwellian
electrodynamics and (apparently) in relativistic spacetime theories.
After Bell’s theorem, that picture is untenable. Bell proves that Nature is non-
local if certain predictions of quantum mechanics are correct. Many experimental
tests (starting with Aspect et al. (1982a) and Aspect et al. (1982b)) have been per-
formed. They confirm over and over again the predictions of quantum mechanics.
Hence, we should have extremely high confidence in the conclusion that Nature is
non-local: events that are arbitrarily far apart in space can instantaneously influence
each other. (In the relativistic setting, it amounts to the conclusion that events that
are space-like separated can influence each other.)
However, not everyone is convinced. In fact, there are still disagreements about
what Bell proved and how general the result is. Some disagreements can be traced
to misunderstandings about the assumptions in the proof. Others may be due to
more general issues about scientific explanations and the standards of theory choice.
There are many good articles and books about Bell’s theorem.(For example, see
Maudlin (2011, 2014), and Myrvold and Shimony (2019).) In this short article, I
would like to focus on two strategies that attempt to avoid the conclusion of non-
locality. They are about (1) quantum probabilities and (2) super-determinism, both
having to do, in some ways, with the philosophy of probability. First, I argue that
solving the problem by changing the axioms of classical probability theory is a
non-starter, as Bell’s theorem only uses frequencies and proportions that obey the
rules of arithmetic. Moreover, this point is independent of any interpretation of
probability (such as frequentism). Second, I argue that a super-deterministic theory
likely requires an extremely complex initial condition, one that deserves a much
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lower prior probability than its non-local competitors. Since both issues can be
appreciated without much technical background and have implications for other
subfields of philosophy, I will try to present them in a non-technical way that is
accessible to non-specialists. The lessons we learn from them also apply to the more
recently proven theorem (2012) of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph about the reality of
the quantum state, which is in the same spirit as Bell’s theorem. (Their theorem says
that, under plausible assumptions, quantum states represent states of reality rather
than merely our knowledge about reality.)
2 Bell’s Theorem
There are many versions of Bell’s theorem and Bell inequalities. For illustration,
in this section, we discuss a version of them by adapting a simple example involv-
ing perfect correlations discussed in Maudlin (2011)§1. (Another simple example,
involving perfect anti-correlations, can be found in Albert (1992)§3. )
Under certain physical conditions, the calcium atom can emit a pair of photons
that travel in opposite directions: left and right. We have labs that can realize such
conditions. In this situation, we can set up polarizers on the left and on the right, as
well as devices on both sides that detect photons that happen to pass through the
polarizers. If a photon is absorbed by a polarizer, then the photon detector placed
behind the polarizer will detect nothing. (Herewe assume that the photon detectors
are 100% reliable. The idealization can be relaxed, and analyses have been done to
show that the differences do not change the conclusion we want to draw.) Further,
we can arrange the polarizers to be pointing in any direction on a particular plane.
Each direction is representable by a number between 0 and 180, corresponding to
the clockwise angle of the polarizer away from the vertical direction. Since either
polarizer receives exactly one incoming photon, we say that the pair of photons
agree if they either both passed or both got absorbed by the polarizers (so the
photon detectors on both sides clicked or neither did); they disagree if one passed
but the other got absorbed (so exactly one photon detector clicked).
When we carry out the experiments, say, by using 100,000 pairs of photons,
quantum mechanics predict that we would observe the following:
• Prediction 1: If the left polarizer and the right polarizer point in the same
direction, 100% of the pairs agree.
• Prediction 2: If the left polarizer and the right polarizer differ in direction by
30 degrees, 25% of the pairs disagree.
• Prediction 3: If the left polarizer and the right polarizer differ in direction by
60 degrees, 75% of the pairs disagree.
(The situation is a bit simplified. In actual experiments, the empirical frequencies
will be approximately 25% and approximately 75% respectively and will increas-
ingly approach them as we carry out more trials.) In the end, these statistics will be
shown to clash with a plausible hypothesis of locality:
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Locality Events arbitrarily far away cannot instantaneously influence each other.
Bell shows that the conjunction of Locality and the predictions of quantum
mechanics leads to a contradiction. There are two parts in Bell’s argument. The
first part is based on the argument of Einstein et al. (1935), also known as the EPR
argument.
In the context of our example, the EPR argument can be summarized as follows.
First, the photon traveling to the left and the photon traveling to the right can be
separated arbitrarily far away. Second, we can always place a polarizer in the path
of the photon on the left and another in the path of the photon on the right. Third,
according to Prediction 1, if the two polarizers point in the samedirection, the pair of
photons always agree, however far away they are from each other. Moreover, if we
first measure the photon on the left and find that it passed the polarizer on the left,
then we do not even need to measure the photon on the right if the polarizer on the
right points in the same direction; we know the result—it will pass the polarizer on
the right. Assume Locality: what happens to the photon on the (distant) left cannot
instantaneously influence the photon on the (distant) right. So there is already a fact
of the matter, before measurement, about the result on the right. Hence, Locality
implies that there are facts of the matter about the polarization direction of the
photon on the left and the photon on the right. In other words, their values of
polarizations are predetermined.
Here is another way to see this. Given Prediction 1, since there is no way
to “know” the directions of the two polarizers, the photons must already agree,
even inside the calcium atom, how they would react to the polarizers come what
may. That is, they must already agree whether to both pass or both get absorbed
for polarizers pointing to any particular angle. For example, they must “agree”
how to react when faced with a polarizer pointing at 0 degrees, when faced a
polarizer pointing at 30 degrees, when faced a polarizer pointing at 60 degrees, and
so on. Otherwise they would not be able to satisfy Prediction 1. However, such
predetermined facts are not included in the quantummechanical description using a
wave function. So somehow these facts will be encoded in further parameters going
beyond quantum theory. Indeed, the EPR argument aims to show that Locality
implies that quantummechanics is an incomplete description of Nature. (A famous
example of a theory that adds additional parameters is the de Broglie-Bohm theory,
but it is manifestly non-local in the particle dynamics. So it is not an example of the
kind of local completion of quantummechanics that EPR look for. Nevertheless, the
non-local character of the de Broglie-Bohm theory was one of the motivations for
Bell to investigate the generality of non-locality. See Bell (1964)§1 and Bell (2001a).)
In short, what was shown by EPR and used in Part I of Bell’s argument is the
following:
Part I Locality & Quantum PredictionsÔ⇒ Predetermined Values
In Part II, Bell shows the following:
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Part II Predetermined Values & Quantum PredictionsÔ⇒ Contradiction
Wewill see that predetermined values and quantumpredictions lead to a contra-
dictionwith the laws of arithmetic (regarding addition,multiplication, and fraction).
Recall that there are facts of the matter about the polarization properties of the pair
of photons. But there are still two possibilities for each angle. For example, for
polarizers pointing at 30 degrees, there can be two alternatives: both pass and both
get absorbed. To simplify the example, we assume that the directions of the polar-
izers have only three choices (say, limited by the turning knobs on the devices): 0
degrees, 30 degrees, and 60 degrees. Then for each choice of the angle of polarizer,
there can be two possibilities for the pair: both pass (P) or both get absorbed (A).
For example, they may both instantiate P30, which means they will both pass if the
polarizer is pointing at a 30 degrees angle; they may both instantiate A60, which
means they will both get absorbed if the polarizer is pointing at a 60 degrees angle.
Since 23 = 8, there are exactly eight choices for the assignments of properties in the
two photons.
Eight Possible Assignments of Properties
Left Photon Right Photon Feature Percentage
(1) P0,P30,P60 P0,P30,P60 X α%
(2) A0,A30,A60 A0,A30,A60
(3) A0,P30,P60 A0,P30,P60 Y β%
(4) P0,A30,A60 P0,A30,A60
(5) P0,A30,P60 P0,A30,P60 Z γ%
(6) A0,P30,A60 A0,P30,A60
(7) P0,P30,A60 P0,P30,A60 W δ%
(8) A0,A30,P60 A0,A30,P60
To satisfy Prediction 1, different pairs of photons can choose exactly one of these
eight assignments. If a pair does not choose among these eight, then it can violate
experimental results.
The eight assignments can be put in four groups as indicated in the table. Let us
label the four groups with features X, Y, Z, and W, which we mention again in §3.
Now suppose we have a large number of pairs of photons emitted from a collection
of calcium atoms. (The larger the number, the closer (ratios of) empirical frequencies
will approach the predicted percentages.) Assuming Locality, each pair must adopt
one of the eight assignments listed above. Let α be the percentage of pairs that
realizes either (1) or (2); β be the percentage of pairs that realizes either (3) or (4); γ
be the percentage of pairs that realizes either (5) or (6); and δ be the percentage of
pairs that realizes either (7) or (8). By the laws of arithmetic,
α + β + γ + δ = 100 (1)
Moreover, each percentage number must be non-negative. In particular,
γ ≥ 0 (2)
Therefore,
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γ + δ + β + γ ≥ β + δ (3)
Unfortunately, this is inconsistent with the conjunction of Prediction 2 and Pre-
diction 3. According to Prediction 2, if the the angles of the polarizers on the two
sides differ by 30 degrees, then we find photon disagreement 25% of the time. We
run the large number of pairs of photons with the left polarizer pointing to 0 and
the right pointing to 30. By inspection of the table, we know that pairs realizing
assignments (1) and (2) will agree. So we know that α percent of the pairs agree.
Moreover, we know that pairs realizing assignments (7) and (8) will also agree. That
is another δ percent of pairs that agree. The only pairs that disagree will be those
realizing assignments (3), (4), (5), and (6). That is β + γ percent pairs that disagree.
Hence,
β + γ = 25 (4)
Similar considerations apply when we set the left polarizer at 30 degrees and the
right at 60 degrees. Then,
γ + δ = 25 (5)
According to Prediction 3, if the the angles of the left and the right polarizers
differ by 60 degrees, in our example that is when one is pointing at 0 and the other
60, then pairs of photons disagree 75% of the time. All disagreements come from
photon pairs that realize assignments (3), (4), (7), and (8). Hence,
β + δ = 75 (6)
From the above three equations, since 50 is smaller than 75, we can conclude that
γ + δ + β + γ < β + δ. (7)
But equation (7) is inconsistentwith equation (3). We have arrived at a contradiction.
Hence, the second part of Bell’s argument is established. Together, Part I and Part II
imply:
Locality & Quantum PredictionsÔ⇒ Contradiction
Since quantum predictions have been confirmed to an extremely high degree, we
should have very high confidence that Locality is refuted and that Nature is non-
local. (Here we take quantum predictions to be statistical (regarding empirical
frequencies) rather than probabilistic.) Of course, we have made some implicit
assumptions in the derivation:
(A) The rules of inferences obey classical logic.
(B) The laws of arithmetic are true.
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(C) Frequencies and relative proportions obey the laws of arithmetic.
(D) There are no conspiracies in nature.
Strictly speaking, it is only by assuming (A)—(D) can we derive the contradiction
from Locality and Quantum Predictions. We will return to these implicit assump-
tions in the next two sections.
In this section, we have presented one version of Bell inequalities (in equation
(3)) and explained how it is violated by the predictions of quantum mechanics (in
equation (7)). (Bell’s own version (1964) uses perfect anti-correlation and is stated in
terms of expectation values. Clauser et al. (1969) provides a generalization of Bell’s
result that allow imperfect correlations.)
3 Quantum Probabilities to the Rescue?
Perhaps due to the significance of Bell’s theorem, there have been many attempts
that try to avoid the conclusion by identifying some other “weak link” that has
nothing to do with Locality. (For some examples, see Further Readings in §5.)
That is surprising, since the other assumptions are quite innocuous and a priori, as
illustrated by the previous example.
One purported “weak link” is associated with the “implicit assumptions” about
classical probability theory. Onemight suspect that the derivations of Bell’s theorem
require substantive assumptions about classical probability theory. And probability
is notoriously difficult to understand. Hence, there may be room to revise certain
assumptions in the standard probability given empirical data. The suggestion is
that, instead of rejecting Locality, we canmodify (or generalize) the classical axioms
and algebraic structure of Kolmogorov probability theory to avoid the contradiction.
(For example, see Pitowsky (1989), Fine (1982a), and Fine (1982b).)
However, the previous example serves as a counterexample. In the argument
of §2, assumptions of classical probability theory do not even occur. Nor do they
implicitly play any essential role. All we ever neededwere relative proportions and
how they arithmetically interact with each other (addition, multiplication, subtrac-
tion, and division). For example, Predictions 1, 2, and 3 are formulated in terms of
percentages of pairs of photons. The four groups of possible assignment of prop-
erties receive percentages α, β, γ, and δ. We call them “percentages,” which may
remind readers of probabilities. But in our argument they merely represent relative
proportions. To say that α percent of the pairs realize property assignments (1) or
(2) is to say that the number of pairs having those properties is exactly α per 100
pairs. If we have 100,000 pairs in total in the collection, then that amounts to 1000×α
pairs.
Since the percentages α, β, γ, and δ represent relative proportions, it is in their
nature that they obey the laws of arithmetic, and their bearers (property assignments
(1)-(8)) obey the rules of Boolean algebra. The fact that we are assuming, in the con-
ditional proof, they have hidden properties does not matter at all. As such, relative
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proportions obey the axioms governing how we should count a finite number of
things, which obey the Kolmogorovian axioms, which may also govern probabili-
ties (according to some interpretations of probability). Nevertheless, that does not
make relative proportions subject to various interpretational issues as probability
does. (Tumulka (2015) makes a similar point.) Many other concepts also satisfy
Kolmogorovian axioms, including as mass, length, and volume of finite physical
objects. Neither are they subject to the interpretational controversies surrounding
the concept of probabilities. Probability faces a wide range of interpretational puz-
zles, and it is controversial what its axioms ought to be. Still, there are no similar
difficulties with concepts of mass, length, volume, frequencies, or proportions.
Why is it in the nature of frequencies and proportions to obey the laws of
arithmetic or counting finite number of things? This may seem like a question
in the philosophy of mathematics. Fortunately, we do not need to settle those
controversies to answer that question for our purposes here. The discussion about
non-classical probability spaces and Bell’s theorem is sometimes highly technical,
and different proposals have been suggested to understand violations of the rules of
Boolean algebra andKolmogorov axioms. For our purposeswe candistill the central
intuitions using the concrete example of §2. Suppose we have a large collection of
photon pairs adequately prepared. Consider four features that each photon pair
can have—X, Y, Z, and W—that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, and
consider the following propositions:
(i) The percentage of photon pairs having exactly one of the four features is 100%.
(ii) The percentage of photon pairs having feature Z is non-negative.
(iii) The percentage of photon pairs having either Y or W is the sum of the per-
centage of photon pairs having Y and the percentage of photon pairs having
W.
(iv) The sum of percentage of photon pairs having the property (Y or Z) and the
percentage of photon pairs having the property (Z or W) is well defined—a
non-negative number.
Can these propositions be false? In particular, can they fail in the following ways?
(i’) The percentage of photon pairs having exactly one of the four features is 115%.
(ii’) The percentage of photon pairs having feature Z is −5%.
(iii’) The percentage of photon pairs having either Y or W is less than the sum of
the percentage of photon pairs having Y and the percentage of photon pairs
having W.
(iv’) The sum of percentage of photon pairs having the property (Y or Z) and the
percentage of photon pairs having the property (Z or W) does not exist.
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It is a priori that propositions (i)—(iv) cannot be false while propositions (i’)—(iv’)
cannot be true. Propositions such as (i)—(iv) are sufficient to prove the violation of
a Bell inequality (equation (3)) in §2. They are not dependent on any substantive
theory or axioms about probabilities, because they are about relative proportions
and not about probabilities. We do not need to appeal to assumptions about the
nature of probabilities to prove that Nature is non-local.
A common misunderstanding is that, to say the thing we just said, we must
be endorsing a particular interpretation of probability—frequentism, according to
which probabilities boil down to long-run frequencies. But that is a mistake. We
can make judgments about those eight propositions without endorsing any par-
ticular interpretation of probability. To evaluate them, we do not have to settle
the debate among subjectivism, frequentism, and the propensity interpretations.
For example, one can be a subjective Bayesian about probabilities and still accept
that frequencies, percentages, and relative proportions obey propositions (i)—(iv).
One can even adopt the view that the actual axioms governing real probabilities
are non-Kolmogorovian and involving non-Boolean algebra without denying that
frequencies and proportions obey the rules of arithmetic. (Moreover, the actual ev-
idence we use to support quantum theory consists in empirical frequencies, which
obviously obey the classical probability axioms.)
However, not everyone would agree with our assessment. Pitowsky (1989) and
Fine (1982a,b) take Bell’s theorem to suggest we can perhaps keep locality by revis-
ing classical probability theory. (See Malament (2006) for a characteristically clear
explication of this project. Feintzeig (2015) demonstrates further mathematical con-
straints on that project.) The project has led to important mathematical results that
can shed light on the mathematical structures of impossibility theorems (see espe-
cially Pitowsky’s geometric interpretation of Bell-type inequalities). Nevertheless,
if the above analysis is correct, then the project of avoiding non-locality by revising
probability axioms is a non-starter; it cannot even get off the ground, no matter
how ingenious or elegant the models of non-classical probability spaces are. No
matter what changes we make to classical probability theory, they do not affect the
conclusion of non-locality. The argument for non-locality does not rely on classical
probability theory. We only need to use rules for counting relative proportions.
Quantum probability (as an alternative to classical probability) is related to
quantum logic (as an alternative to classical logic). Some people who want to keep
classical logic may nonetheless be open to revise the axioms of probability to make
room for locality. But as we just discussed, it is the axioms governing frequencies
and relative proportions that need to be revised if one goes that route. Since they
obey the axioms of arithmetics, and since the latter are closely related to logic, it is
hard to see how to pursue this route without also revising logic in some way. (See
Wilce (2017) for a survey of quantum logic and quantum probability theory.)
Therefore, it is a non-starter to try to save Locality by changing the axioms gov-
erning classical probability theory. Which probability theory is correct is irrelevant
to the question whether Nature is non-local.
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4 Escape with Super-Determinism?
Another purported “weak link” in Bell’s argument is associated with the assump-
tion of statistical independence. The strategy is to allow violations of statistical
independence in favor of “super-deterministic” theories. (This is sometimes la-
beled as “conspiratorial theories.”) At the moment we do not have much evidence
suggesting that strategy is likely to work. Nevertheless, understanding what it is
and how it is supposed to work are of general philosophical interest.
In §2, we assumed that the direction of the polarizer can be set independently
of the collection of incoming photon pairs. We can, for example, use a mechanical
device that randomly selects among the three choices—pointing at 0 degrees, 30
degrees, and 60 degrees. That assumption—statistical independence—seems fun-
damental to scientific experimentation. Another way to see it is in terms of random
sampling. Given any collection of photon pairs adequately prepared, and after the
experimental set up is completed, we can perform random sampling on the collec-
tion and obtain a sub-collection that reflects the same statistical profile as the overall
collection. That is, if the sub-collection is such that 25% of them would disagree
when pairs of photons pass through polarization filters that differ by 30 degrees,
then the whole collection would also have that property. In other words, the choice
of the experimental setup can be made statistically independent of the choice of
the sub-collections. Statistical independence enables us to apply the conjunction of
Prediction 1, Prediction 2, and Prediction 3 to the collection as a whole (and to each
sub-collection) and to deduce equations (4), (5), and (6), from which we derive a
contradiction with inequality (3).
Without assuming statistical independence, the inference is not valid. We can
construct an example in which the quantum predictions are all satisfied during
experiments but there is no contradiction. Suppose we have 100,000 photon pairs
to start with. Each photon pair realizes one of the eight assignments listed in the
table. Suppose further that α = β = γ = δ = 25.We have three experimental setups:
(A) Left polarizer at 0 degrees, right polarizer at 30 degrees.
(B) Left polarizer at 30 degrees, right polarizer at 60 degrees.
(C) Left polarizer at 0 degrees, right polarizer at 60 degrees.
From the collection of 100,000 photon pairs, we choose three sub-collections—(a),
(b), and (c)—each with exactly 100 photon pairs. It turns out that, when we send
(a) through (A), 25% of them disagree; when we send (b) through (B), 25% of them
disagree; when we send (c) through C, 75% of them disagree. (As before, this is
an idealization. The fractions get closer to these numbers when we run the trials
with more pairs.) This can be realized in the following way. In (a), 25 pairs are
of type (3) and the rest are of type (1); in (b), 25 pairs are of type (5), and the
rest are of type (1); in (c), 75 pairs are of type (7) and the rest are of type (1).
That is, sub-collection (a) has exactly the kind of statistical profile required to be
in agreement with quantum predictions for experiment (A); sub-collection (b) for
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(B); and the sub-collection (c) for (C). Hence, each sub-collection has the “right”
statistical profile matching the experimental setup it goes through, but none of them
has the statistical profile required by the conjunction of the three predictions. Still,
the outcomes of experiments are consistent with quantum predictions. The problem
is that the sampling is not random. Somehow, the choice of which photon pairs to
send to which experimental setup is correlated with the choice of the experimental
setup itself. In this case, equations (4)—(6) do not hold for the entire collection or
any particular sub-collection, and γ+δ+β+γ is larger than or equal to β+δwithout
contradicting quantum predictions. In this case, 100 ≥ 50; no contradictions exist
between outcomes of actual experiments and the assumption of Locality.
Such a violation of statistical independence would seem to require some ex-
traordinary conspiracies in Nature. Not only does this have to be true for these
particular setups, which is incredible already, we need there to be conspiracies in
a similar way for any such experimental setup, done by anyone, anywhere, and
anytime. No matter where, when, and who to carry out the experiment, the strat-
egy suggests that no matter what random sampling method we use, the photon
pairs with the “right” statistical profile will always find themselves at the “right”
experimental setup. Nature conspires to hide its locality from us.
Such extraordinary features may be difficult to achieve in any realistic physical
theories. Are there any physical theories that can do this? I am not aware of
any worked out theory at the moment. However, some initial steps have been
taken to investigate possible dynamics and toy models. ’T Hooft (2014) provides an
illustration. Hossenfelder and Palmer (2019) provide an update-to-date overview
with some philosophical justifications.
Critics of such theories have focused on the fact that endorsing violations of
statistical independence would be bad for science in one way or another. For exam-
ple, Shimony et al. (1976) argue that it would undermine the scientific enterprise of
discovery by experimentation:
In any scientific experiment in which two or more variables are sup-
posed to be randomly selected, one can always conjecture that some
factor in the overlap of the backwards light cones has controlled the
presumably random choices. But, we maintain, skepticism of this sort
will essentially dismiss all results of scientific experimentation. Unless
we proceed under the assumption that hidden conspiracies of this sort
do not occur, we have abandoned in advance the whole enterprise of
discovering the laws of nature by experimentation.
Maudlin (2019) suggests that it would make it impossible to do science:
If we fail to make this sort of statistical independence assumption,
empirical science can no longer be done at all. For example, the observed
strong robust correlation betweenmice being exposed to cigarette smoke
and developing cancer in controlled experiments means nothing if the
mice who are already predisposed to get cancer somehow always end
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up in the experimental rather than control group. But we would regard
that hypothesis as crazy.
Hossenfelder and Palmer (2019) respond that while elementary particles have
to violate statistical independence for the Bell-type experiments, it does not follow
that all kinds of systems in every context have to violate statistical independence.
As far as I can understand it, the proposal is to limit the violations of statisti-
cal independence to particular special systems—those that are subject to Bell-type
tests. While this may save the standard method of randomized control trials and
experimentation in medical contexts, it seems to be extremely ad hoc. But that does
not mean it is absolutely impossible in Nature.
While I am not persuaded by the above defense of superdeterminism, I would
like to suggest a different way to understand the problems of superdeterminism.
I suggest that superdeterminism of this sort is unlikely to result in a simple fun-
damental theory. The constraints on empirical frequencies are so severe that it is
unlikely to be written down in any simple formula. In order for the local theory to
be compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics, it would have to rad-
ically constrain the state space of the local theory so that only a very small class
of histories will be allowed. Not all arrangements of the local parameters will be
permitted—otherwise one cannot guarantee perfect agreement with quantum pre-
dictions. What kind of constraints? They will have to encode as much information
as the setup and outcomes of all the Bell-type experiments. Since such experiments
come in so many forms in such a wide variety of circumstances, it is hard to be-
lieve that the constraints will be simple at all. In fact, we have every reason to
believe that they will be extremely complicated. Moreover, because of the lack of
simplicity, such constraints will not look lawlike. Hence, a theory that embodies
such strong determinism will be extremely complex and difficult to compete with
other candidate theories that are far simpler. For example, ’T Hooft (2014)’s Cellular
Automaton Theory requires the selection of an initial state, the characterization of
which will be extremely complicated.
Kronz (1990) suggests that we should prefer, other things being equal, a simpler
theory on pragmatic grounds, which is why we should discount the conspiratorial
theories. I would like to go further: simplicity is a hallmark for fundamental laws of
nature. A superdeterministic theory will likely postulate an extremely complicated
initial condition that looks nothing like a fundamental law.
In this sense, the problem of superdeterminism boils down to a familiar objective
constraint on fundamental laws of nature. A fundamental law should not be too
complex. When we evaluate competing theories we are judging them (in part) by
the relative complexities of the fundamental laws. Among competing observation-
ally equivalent theories, themore complex a theory is the lower prior probability we
should assign to it. This corresponds to an objective Bayesianway of thinking about
probabilities. However, complexity (and simplicity) comes in degrees. Now, sim-
plicity and complexity are notoriously vague. But they are indispensable theoretical
tools when we confront observationally equivalent theories. For our purpose here,
one can plug in any reasonable notion of simplicity and complexity for evaluating
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scientific theories.
It is true that many theories constrain initial states in order to explain certain
wide-spread regularities. For example, in a universe with abundant time asymme-
tries, we postulate a low-entropy initial condition. That is now called the Past Hy-
pothesis (Albert (2000)). However, wehave reasons to think that the PastHypothesis
is not extremely complex. Indeed, it can be specified in terms of simple macroscopic
variables (the values of the pressure, density, volume, and energy of the early uni-
verse). In some situations, it can even be specified in simple microscopic variables,
such as Penrose (1979)’s Weyl Curvature Hypothesis or Ashtekar and Gupt (2016)’s
initial condition for Loop Quantum Cosmology. In the density-matrix-realist quan-
tum frameworks, the Past Hypothesis can be replaced by the Initial Projection Hy-
pothesis (Chen (2018)) that pins down a unique quantummicrostate of the universe.
One of the reasons that the Past Hypothesis is subject to the constraint of simplicity
is that it is interpreted as a fundamental law. It is regarded as a fundamental law
because it underlies various nomological generalizations such as the Second Law of
Thermodynamics.
The superdetermistic theories, in contrast, will likely postulate something much
more complicated than the Past Hypothesis as an initial condition. If such a su-
perdeterministic theory is devised, we should also interpret its initial condition as
a fundamental law of nature. (At the very least, it should be given a fundamental
axiomatic status in the theory since it is not derived from other laws or principles.)
The wide-spread violations of Bell-type inequalities cry out for explanations. In
such a superdeterministic theory, the initial condition is supposed to do the work of
explaining why arbitrarily far away events are correlated with each other. We see
no reason at all why such a theory (and especially its constraint on the state space)
will be simple enough. At least we do not have any evidence that it will be simpler
than the competing non-superdeterministic and non-local theories that are already
on the market, such as Bohmian mechanics and GRW theory (see the survey articles
by Tumulka and Lewis in this volume). In fact, we have every reason to expect that
any empirically adequate superdeterministic theory will be far more complex.
Hence, there are significant differences between the superdeterministic theory
that constrains its initial states to explain Bell-type correlations and a regular quan-
tum theory that constrains its initial states (by the Past Hypothesis) to explain
temporal asymmetries. However, these are differences in degrees and not of kind.
If a superdeterministic theory aims to recover all quantumpredictions, then itwould
be observationally equivalent to Bohmian mechanics andmore or less equivalent to
some versions of GRW theory. But Bohmian mechanics and GRW theory are likely
far simpler than the superdeterministic theory. Hence, the superdeterministic the-
ory should receive extremely low prior probability than either Bohmian mechanics
or GRW theory. (As for the Past Hypothesis, it does not have any observationally
equivalent competitors. Even if we consider Carroll and Chen (2004)’s model that
aspires to explain temporal asymmetries without the Past Hypothesis, it is not clear
whether their model is simpler than one with the Past Hypothesis.)
Nevertheless, that does not mean we should assign 0 credence to superdeter-
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minism. Instead, I think we should follow Bell (2001b) and be open-minded in a
qualified way:
Of course it might be that these reasonable ideas about physical ran-
domizers are just wrong – for the purpose at hand. A theory may appear
in which such conspiracies inevitably occur, and these conspiracies may
then seem more digestible than the non-localities of other theories. When that
theory is announced I will not refuse to listen, either on methodological
or other grounds. (my emphasis)
If one constructs a superdeterministic theory that is simpler than a non-local theory
such as Bohmian mechanics or GRW theory, we should be be open to assign much
higher credence in it. At the moment, no such theory is available.
5 Conclusion
In this short survey article, I introduced Bell’s theorem by discussing a simple
example. I focused on two strategies that try to get around the conclusion of non-
locality: (1) changing the axioms of classical probability theory and (2) embracing
superdeterminism and allowing violations of statistical independence. Both have
to do in some way with the philosophy of probability. However, neither is likely
to work. Nevertheless, understanding their motivations and problems can help us
come to a deeper understanding of Bell’s theorem, its significance, and the relevance
(or irrelevance) of the nature of probability.
6 Further readings
• The issue of “realism” in Bell’s proof: see Norsen (2007), Maudlin (2014), and
Tumulka (2015).
• Non-locality, superluminal signaling, and relativistic invariance: see Maudlin
(2011) for a landmark monograph on the topic; see Tumulka (2006) and
Bedingham et al. (2014) for collapse models that demonstrate the compati-
bility of Lorentz invariance and non-locality.
• Locality and non-locality in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum me-
chanics: see Wallace (2012)§8 and Allori et al. (2010).
• Parameter independence andoutcome independence: see Jarrett (1984), Shimony
(1989), Healey (1992), and Maudlin (2011)§4.
• Causation and causal explanations: see Bell (1981), Redhead (1989), Healey
(1992), and Maudlin (2011)§5.
• Retrocausality: see Friederich and Evans (2019) for a review.
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• Experimental tests and certain loophole-free tests of Bell’s inequalities: see
Myrvold and Shimony (2019)§4-§5 for a review.
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